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matter for the Legislature rather than the court.20 In any event,
it is clear that a disavowal of a child conceived during the marriage must be based on one of the fact situations provided in the
Code. Therefore, evidence obtained from blood grouping tests,
or any other evidence which may prove non-paternity with equal
certainty, will be inadmissible in actions en d~saveu until the
Legislature specifically authorizes their use.
William H. Cook, Jr.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT-MUNICIPAL

IMMUNITY

FROM TORT

LIABILITY-THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION

Plaintiffs sued the City of New Orleans to recover damages
for the death of their four-year old son who drowned in a pool
of water which was allowed to accumulate in an area maintained
by the city as a garbage dump. Plaintiffs alleged that the deceased child had been attracted to the pond by a large number
of sea gulls which constantly lined its banks. The city filed an
exception of no cause of action based on the theory that a municipality is immune from liability for damages arising ex delicto
from its exercise of a governmental function. The trial court
maintained the exception and dismissed the suit. On appeal,
held, exception overruled and case remanded. The immunity of
municipalities does not extend to cases in which an attractive
nuisance has been created or maintained by the municipality.1
Burris v. New Orleans, 86 So.2d 549 (La. App. 1956), cert. denied, June 11, 1956.
At Anglo-American law, while municipalities are held liable
in damages for torts committed by their employees in the exercise of "proprietary" functions, they are immune from liability
for torts committed in the exercise of "governmental" functions.2
20. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in such cases as Feazel v.
Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952), and Lejeune v. Lejeune, 184 La. 837,
167 So. 747 (1936), it could be said that the real rationale behind the exclusion
of the blood test evidence is the desire of the court to prevent the bastardizing of
any child conceived during the marriage, despite the fact that the Code provides
for the action en ddsaveu under certain circumstances.
1. The court held that under some circumstances a pond may be an attractive
nuisance. See Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949) ;
Fincher v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 143 La. 164, 78 So. 433 (1918). See Comment,
10 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 469 (1950).
2. Wysocki v. City of Derby, 140 Conn. 173, 98 A.2d 659 (1953) ; Woodford
v. City of St. Petersburg, 84 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1955) ; Heitman v. Lake City, 225
Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18 (1947) ; Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 23
S.E.2d 42 (1942) ; Tolliver v. City of Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357
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In many jurisdictions, an exception to this municipal immunity
is made in cases involving injury resulting from a nuisance
which has been created or maintained by a municipality.8 Although the courts which recognize this nuisance exception use
it extensively to allow recovery against municipalities, 4 the exception is held not to extend to cases involving attractive nuisances." Louisiana follows the general rule of municipal immunity from liability for damages arising ex delicto from the
exercise of governmental functions. 6 Prior to the instant case,
however, the Louisiana courts had apparently never directly
to
considered the question of whether the nuisance exception
7
municipal immunity is to be recognized in this state.
(1945) ; Vaughn v. City of Alcoa, 194 Tenn. 449, 251 S.W.2d 304 (1952) ; Lakoduk v. Cruger, 287 P.2d 338 (Wash. 1955). The only jurisdiction not recognizing
the classification of municipal functions into proprietary and governmental functions is South Carolina. In that state, since the decision in Irvine v. Town of
Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911), the rule is that municipalities are
immune from liability for damages resulting from the exercise of any municipal
function, unless liability is imposed by statute. Sammons v. City of Beaufort, 225
S.C. 490, 83 S.E.2d 153 (1954). See Note, 16 LoUISIANA LAW REvIEw 812
(1956).
3. Downey v. Jackson, 259 Ala. 189, 65 So.2d 825 (1953); Ingram v. City
of Acworth, 90 Ga. App. 719, 84 S.E.2d 99 (1954) ; Steifer v. Kansas City, 175
Kan. 794, 267 P.2d 474 (1954); Wershba v. City of Lynn, 324 Mass. 327, 86
N.E.2d 511 (1949) ; Kinnischtzke v. City of Glen Ullin, 79 N.D. 495, 57 N.W.2d
588 (1953) ; Levene v. City of Salem, 191 Ore. 182, 229 P.2d 255 (1951) ; Vaughn
v. City of Alcoa, 194 Tenn. 449, 251 S.W.2d 304 (1952). But a city is not liable
for failure to abate a nuisance which it did not create, except after notice and
request to abate it. City of Phoenix v. Harlan, 75 Ariz. 290, 255 P.2d 609 (1953);
18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.47 (3d ed. 1949).
4. Lindemeyer v. Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 637, 6 N.W.2d 653 (1942),t "The
'nuisance doctrine' has so far developed as to indicate that there is a growing
belief that any wrong committed by a municipality may be redressed on the
theory that it is a nuisance."
5. Sroufe v. Garden City, 148 Kan. 874, 84 P.2d 845 (1938); Von Almen's
Adm'r v. Louisville, 180 Ky. 441, 202 S.W. 880 (1918) ; Carder v. City of Clarksburg, 100 W.Va. 605, 131 S.E. 349 (1926); Britten v. City of Eau Claire, 260
Wis. 382, 51 N.W.2d 30 (1952) ; Wilson v. City of Laramie, 65 Wyo. 234, 199
P.2d 119 (1948) (reviewing authorities). But see Melendez v. Los Angeles, 60
P.2d 865 (Calif. 1936) (attractive nuisance stated a cause of action although
created in the exercise of governmental function, but this was based on statute
prohibiting defective conditions after notice) ; Galleher v. City of Wichita, 179
Kan. 513, 296 P.2d 1062 (1956) (city not liable because of lack of control, but
the court strongly implied that it would have been liable had it had control);
Doran v. Kansas City, 237 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. App. 1951) (city liable for death of
plaintiff's two sons who drowned in public park, without discussion of municipal
immunity).
6. Barber Laboratories v. New Orleans, 227 La. 104, 78 So.2d 525 (1955)
Prunty v. Shreveport, 223 La. 475, 66 So.2d 3 (1953).
7. The language in two injunction cases indicates that the Louisiana courts
are not favorably disposed toward granting immunity to municipalities for nuisances created or maintained in the exercise of a governmental function, but in
neither case was the question of damages considered. In Gibson v. Baton Rouge,
161 La. 637, 109 So. 339 (1926), in which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
defendant city from maintaining a nuisance, the court said that "municipalities
are no more privileged to maintain a public nuisance than are private individuals."
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In the instant case the damages for which recovery were
sought arose from the city's exercise of the governmental func-

tion of garbage disposal.8 Plaintiffs would therefore be denied

recovery for the death of their child unless an exception were
made to the rule of municipal immunity. The court, recognizing
that the question was res nova in Louisiana, decided not only
to adopt the nuisance exception but also to include the doctrine
of attractive nuisance within it. Thus the Louisiana court has
encroached upon municipal immunity one step further than have
the courts of other jurisdictions. 9
The doctrine of municipal immunity is condemned by courts

and writers alike as being unjust and illogical. 10 It is therefore
Id. at 638, 109 So. at 340. Denying relief on the ground that the city could not
immediately change its system of garbage disposal, the subject of the action, the
court expressly refrained from deciding whether plaintiffs were without a remedy for future damages resulting from the nuisance. In Ryan v. Louisiana Society
for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 62 So.2d 296, 300 (La. App. 1953), the
court said, in dictum, that "a municipal corporation, no more than any individual
or private corporation can maintain or cause a nuisance, and the same remedies
exist, generally speaking, against a nuisance arising from municipal action as in
other cases." (Emphasis added.) In view of the fact that torts of municipalities
are often in the nature of nuisances [3 COOLEY, TORTS 238, § 450 (4th ed. 1932)],
it is likely that the reason for the lack of decisions on the question of recovery
for damages against a municipality for injuries resulting from a nuisance which
is created or maintained in the exercise of governmental functions is that Louisiana plaintiffs have not been aware of the nuisance exception in other jurisdictions. In the instant case the plaintiffs did not even use the term nuisance or
attractive nuisance in the pleadings, but the court found that the allegations of
fact were sufficient to indicate that the plaintiffs intended to rely on the doctrine
of attfactive nuisance.
8. The court in Manguno v. New Orleans, 155 So. 41 (La. App. 1934) declared garbage disposal to be a governmental function.
9. All of the courts which have considered the question of whether recovery
may be had against a municipality for injury resulting from an attractive nuisance
which is created or maintained by the municipality in the exercise of a governmental function have held in the negative. See note 5 supra. The court in the
instant case noted that some courts allow recovery for injury resulting from a
nuisance and that other courts do not allow recovery for injury resulting from
an attractive nuisance in such cases. From this, the court concluded that a conflict exists among the courts of other jurisdictions. It is difficult to tell, from the
language used, whether the court was led into this error through a failure adequately to distinguish between the separate and distinct doctrines or whether the
court simply assumed that if the nuisance device is treated as an exception to
municipal immunity then the attractive nuisance device should be similarly treated.
10. See, for example, Orgeron v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 19 La. App.
628, 140 So. 282 (1932) (author of opinion in Instant case criticizing municipal
immunity); Barker v. Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943) (collecting
many authorities, such as legal periodicals, annotations, and judicial decisions
criticizing municipal immunity) ; Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158,
126 N.E. 72 (1919) (for a lengthy and excellent criticism of the doctrine) ; Kilbourn v. Seattle, 43 Wash.2d 373, 261 P.2d 407 (1953) ; Britten v. City of Eau
Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W.2d 30 (1952). See also 18 McQunLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 53.02 (3d ed. 1949); PROSSER, LAw or TORTS § 109 (2d ed.
1955) ; Green, Freedom of Litigation (11I), Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL.
L. REv. 355 (1944).
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not surprising to find that the courts are eager to retreat from
the immunity doctrine. The nuisance exception to municipal

immunity is but one of the devices through which the effects
Despite this
of the immunity doctrine have been curtailed."
attitude, the courts of common law jurisdictions have refused

to include attractive nuisance within the established framework
of the nuisance exception or to make a separate exception in

cases involving attractive nuisances. 12 The different historical
backgrounds of the two doctrines would in some measure sup-

port a contention that attractive nuisance bears no relation to
the nuisance doctrine which would justify its inclusion within

the nuisance exception. 8 It is believed, however, that the nuisance exception is founded simply upon the desire of the courts
to retreat from an unpopular immunity. 14

Viewed in this light,

any argument that because these two doctrines are based on
different legal theories the nuisance exception should not be
extended to cover attractive nuisance situations would seem
hollow. In this connection, it is interesting to note that, much
as the nuisance doctrine is used to retreat from the well-established immunity of municipalities, attractive nuisance was
devised to retreat from the equally well-established immunity

of landowners from liability for negligence to trespassers.' 5 The

use of the attractive nuisance doctrine to effect a further retreat
11. Probably the most effective single device which the courts have developed
in order to circumvent the application of the municipal immunity doctrine is the
classification of municipal functions into proprietary and governmental, recovery
being denied only for injury resulting from the exercise of those functions which
are classified as governmental. See note 2 aupra.
12. See note 5 eupra.
13. The term "nuisance" was used as early as the thirteenth century, at a
time when negligence was unknown in legal theory, to refer to interferences with
servitudes or other rights to the free use of land. "Nuisance" has since become
little more than an epithet, used by courts to refer to a condition brought about
by almost any type of conduct, including negligence, whenever it is deemed convenient to avoid any analysis of a problem. 3 COOLEY, TORTS § 399 (4th ed. 1932)
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 70, 74 (2d ed. 1955).
The doctrine now known as attractive nuisance stems from the decision in Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 657 (1873), the well-known turntable case.
That decision, however, based recovery for the trespassing child's injury on a general negligence theory. Later decisions of most courts [see Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949)1, have restricted the attractive
nuisance doctrine's applicability. The attractive nuisance doctrine is simply a
device used by the courts to effect a necessary compromise between the interest
of society in preserving the safety of its children and interest of landowners to
use their land for their own benefit. PRosSa, LAW OF TORTS § 76 (2d ed. 1955) ;
Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner, 21 MIOH. L. REV. 495
(1923) ; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers,
63 YALE L.J. 144 (1953).
14. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 109 (2d ed. 1955).
15. See note 13 supra.
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from the immunity of municipalities would therefore seem appropriate. As was indicated recently in the Review, 6 it is probable that nothing short of legislative enactment will effectuate
total municipal responsibility for torts. Until such time as this
may happen, however, judicial restraint upon the applicability
of this immunity is necessary in order to avoid injustice. It is
submitted that the instant case achieves a desirable result which
is in line with, and in advance of, the growing trend17 toward
increased municipal liability for tort.
Daniel J. McGee
16. Note, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 812 (1956).
17. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp. and Regional Agriculture Credit Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939) ; Barker v. Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136
P.2d 480 (1943) ; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 109 (2d ed. 1955).

